Strategies of creating a dominant party – the case of UR (0)

University of Tartu
Faculty of Social Sciences and Education
Institute of Government and Politics
Marie Allikmaa
The strategies of creating a dominant party – the case of United Russia
Tartu 2011
After the collapse of USSR in 1991, many observers expected Russia to develop into a competitive party system. Yet, the reality quickly challenged this view. The developments of party politics in post- Soviet Russia have accurately been described in terms of a pendulum effect , as in the 2000s, Russia’s party system did finally begin to take for, but with a remarkable twist .
Following the break of one-party rule, Russia’s party system became strongly fragmented - during the 1995 parliamentary elections, 43 parties competed for popular votes (McFault 1996: 90). In the 21st century, the pendulum has moved back, as the intense party- competition has been replaced with a one-party monopoly. During his term in office, president Putin made a series of reforms that reduced the strength of the most influential pre-existing parties and gathered a majority of the leading politicians into a new pro-Kremlin party called United Russia. While most of world’s contemporary parties have been established by the politicians who seek either politics or public office, United Russia, as well as its predecessors were created by top politicians with the intention to maximize their already existing power and control over country ’s politics. Therefore , unlike in many other post-communist countries, Russia’s party politics in the 2000s with its decline in party fragmentation has not led to the strengthening of democratic party competition. Instead, after the 2007 State Duma elections, it was clear that United Russia had turned into a “party of power” without any considerable opponent in the competition. That is to say, although the overall party system in Russia has remained fragile, within this fragile party system stands one considerably powerful party.
Prior election results clearly demonstrate that United Russia’s position has become hegemonic: since the 2007 elections, the party controls 315 of the 450 seats in the State Duma, 78 of Russia’s 83 executive posts at regional level, majorities in 81 local assemblies, and a large percentage of Russia’s mayoralties, including 8 of the 10 largest cities. The party has a mass membership of over 1.5 million and nearly 60,000 regional, local and primary branches (Reuter 2010: 295).
In this light, as there is considerable reason to believe that Russia’s political system is moving towards a, what is called “dominant party system”, in this paper , I will examine the main strategies, by witch United Russia has gained and perpetuated its dominance. After looking at the main features of a dominant party, I will focus on the reforms in Russia’s electoral law, which supported the nascence of a dominant party. In the second part of the work , I will concentrate on the political strategies, which have helped the party to maintain its hold on power.
Defining the dominant party
The concept of dominant-party system, or one-party dominant system, refers to "a category of parties/political organizations that have successively won election victories and whose future defeat cannot be envisaged or is unlikely for the foreseeable future" (Suttner 2009: 277).
Dominant party regimes are often seen as the contemporary forms of authoritarian rule. For Samuel Huntington, this phenomena is the cause of modernization—social differentiation, economic development, and nationalist struggle—which have created cleavages that could only be repaired through concession, co-optation, and/or organization (Remington and Reuter 2008: 504). Yet, one might say that what distinguishes dominant party systems from totalitarian single -party systems is the fact that dominant parties can still occur within democratic countries where other political parties are tolerated and allowed to operate in a more or less free political landscape . It is just because of the overwhelmingly strong opponent, that other parties do not have the chance of winning the elections. Nevertheless, the circumstances under which a dominant party establishes vary considerably from country to country.
Despite the existing disagreements over the context , scholars have listed many common features that all dominant parties should share. First , a party should receive majority of votes in order to be considered as dominant. Secondly, it should have a dominant bargaining position to exert influence over other parties when necessary. Thirdly, a dominant party should be in power over a considerable period of time. Finally, a party should be dominant governmentally in order to shape the public policy agenda (Basedau 2005: 2).
The Russian dominant party, United Russia, can be seen as sharing three of the above mentioned features. The party is certainly dominant in the first aspect, as it is holding a majority of seats in Duma and in almost every Russian municipality. And it is because of its leading position in Russian party politics, that United Russia does not have a strong need to negotiate with smaller parties. The fact that great amount of candidates seeking public office either at the federal or regional level have joined the party in order to maximize their electoral potential has also strengthen its strategic bargaining position (White 2011: 659). As a tool for the administration, the party may not have a noteworthy role in policy- making , nor does it yet fill the requirements in terms of chronological dominance, but it can be seen as a force for structuring the public policy agenda.
Structuring Political Competition
In July 2000, in his first „state of the nation “ speech at the annual opening of Parliament , president Putin turned to the legislature to express his dissatisfaction with the state of country’s party system and made clear his intention to improve this. A year later , at one of his press conferences Putin declared: „If there are de facto two-, three-, and four -party systems in developed, civilized countries, why do there have to be 350 or 5,000 parties in Russia? This is a kind of Bacchanalia, not democracy “( Rose et al. 2011: 46). Putin’s main aim was to give structure and regularity to political competition. Yet, the established laws were largely seen as attempts to eliminate most parties and assert full state control over the few that survive ( Fish 2001: 77)
Already in December 2000 the presidential law „On Political Parties“ was published. The aim of this new law was to create a system consisting of fewer parties and with all of them having a national range – that is to ban regional parties. The law established political parties as the only form of organizations, which were allowed to participate in elections at the federal and regional levels. Additionally, to be registered as an „electoral association “, the old minimum party membership was raised from 5,000 to 10,000, with a minimum of 100 members from at least half of the regions . The idea of „national scale “embodied not only the geographical aspect but also how representative the parties had to be: they were no longer allowed to address sectional interests (Sakwa 2007: 196). This can be seen as a mean to prevent separatist tendencies, as it prohibited the creation of parties on religious , national or racial foundations.
Putin continued with his party-system reforms in 2004 during his second term in office. The first of these clearly supported Putin’s centralizing program , as it gave the president the right to appoint Russia’s regional governors. Surely, this step had great influence on political parties, especially on United Russia, as the president’s power of appointment is a very strong incentive for governors to join the party: with no independent electoral mandate, governors were forced to earn the approval of the president in order to secure reappointment (Reuter 2010: 299). Thus, the new law gave the president real power over the most influential regional actors in Russia and by doing that helped to maintain the electoral supremacy of United Russia.
The amendment to the law „On the Election of Duma Deputies “, which was passed in 2005 states that all 450 Duma members are elected on party lists in a single nationwide constituency under proportional representation (Law on Elections of Deputies to the State Duma, Article 1). The introduction of the PR electoral system, which removed independent candidates from the elections, assures that only individual political parties can compete .
The amendment also increased the membership demands up to 50,000 with at least 500 members in more than half of the 83 regions of the Federation and no fewer than 250 in other regions ( Articles 5). This change certainly makes it much harder for minor parties to gain or hold the official status of political party.
A further reform, which increased the established parties’ comparative advantage over their opponents concerned the requirements that are obliged to fill in order to participate in Duma elections (Lemaître 2006: 287). For the 2007 election, the number of signatures required was set at 200,000. Parties also had the opportunity to pay a deposit of 60 million rubles. Although party, which already had deputies in the Duma , was relieved from these demands. Following amendments to the law were made in 2009, when the number of required signatures was brought down to 150,000 (Article 8).
Following these reforms, Russia’s party system now definitely looks more similar to those in established democracies. New laws have significantly reduced the number of competing parties, and those that have remained, have considerable representation in national scale. Yet, there are several reasons to believe that the vision of more stable party system rests on the idea of creating a single „party of power“ .
The features of dominant party strategy
Studies of dominant party regimes identify a number of common strategies which help to maintain the dominant party’s power. In this work, three main approaches presented by David White (White 2011: 660) shall be discussed.
First similarity among dominant parties is their adaptability. Of course, at first the party needs to set a common goal and policies, around what it gathers a strong base of supporters and truly dedicated activists. But in consideration of keeping its control, it must take over a rather convenient position, which leaves enough room for political maneuver. Many scholars have argued that the most popular policy position – typically centrist – attract the parties with respect to the voter’s preferences (Greene 2008: 17). Therefore, the dominant party must give up its former positions and re- locate itself to appeal to the widest possible area of voters.
United Russia has successfully followed these prescriptions. Very soon after the establishment of the party, United Russia (called Unity Block in 1999) insisted that it eschewed ideology, at least no other than the support for the current president, as the leader of the party, Sergei Shoigu declared: „We do not bind ourselves to any narrow ideological direction. We are not „centrists“, „rightists“, or „leftists“. We are a party of consolidation of all healthy forces in society, free of ideological bias” (Colton and McFault 2003: 57-58). Assumedly, in this context, “healthy forces” referred to the support for Putin and his government.
It is clear, that the leadership has become the main key in granting party support (Smyth et al. 2007: 124). For example during the 2007 Duma elections campaign, United Russia openly demonstrated its loyalty to president Putin by manifesting „ Vote for Putin’s plan!“, while its position on major policy issues remained questionable (Gel’man 2008: 921). In this light, United Russia can definitely be seen as a leader-oriented, de-ideologized catch -all party.
Secondly, it is also important for a dominant party to mobilize key socio-economic groups. On one hand , dominant party needs to focus on groups that will make fewer demands than others or that will give a maximum political payoff for minimum effort. However , in order to claim to represent the interests of the whole nation, the party must cover wide range of political spectrum and therefore recruit supporters from all parts of society (Arian and Barnes 1974: 598).
A perfect example of United Russia's strive to reach all segments of society is the establishment of All-Russia People's Front – a non-political organization based on the party with the general aim to unite public and non-governmental associations. According to the Putin, the Front was formulated to allow “all members of youth, women ’s and veteran organizations, business associations and trade unions to take direct part in the decision -making process ” by joining its forces (Andreeva 2011).
Within this context, The United Russia has established close relations with major business organizations. For example, the party has settled an agreement in terms of cooperation with the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Peregudov 2009: 52). A strategic alliance has also been created with the country’s leading trade union association, the Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions and with the Women’s Union of Russia ( Ibid 2009: 52). These associations with its employers and employees may be seen as just another expression of the extensive reach of United Russia, of its commitment to put all social segments and organizations that have any considerable impact under the control of political representation.
A third area of commonality among dominant parties is their power to access state resources and control key media organizations with respect to maintain their position. It has been noted (Peregudov 2009: 48), that the most noticeable changes in the party–parliamentary system in contemporary Russia concern the actions by the leadership of United Russia to expand its public ties and contacts outside bureaucratic structures.
Without a doubt, United Russia has often been used as a channel for patronage, material benefits and influencing policy. Belonging to the dominant party gives legislators numerous opportunities to gain access to money and influence. Therefore, once the legislation has reached the floor for a vote, members of United Russia seldom stand against the party’s position (Remington 2008: 214). Since becoming the first party in the State Duma, United Russia has given its members new institutional resources with which to accommodate their need to serve particularistic interests. For example, by increasing the number of legislative committees, the party has created additional opportunities for patronage in particular policy jurisdictions for influential members of the faction (Ibid 2008: 216). In the fourth and fifth Duma, the party dismissed a former consultative, pre-floor intra-party vote trading procedure where individual deputies bargained with the government and replaced it with a closed doors meetings of the fraction Presidium. Therefore, all legislative bargaining now takes place in the Presidium meetings (Reuter 2010: 296).
The party has also taken control over national project funds and in most regions a special party commission has been created to supervise the allocation process. In a January 2006 speech before United Russia Duma deputies, Putin manifested the terms of the relationship between the national projects and United Russia (Ibid 2010: 297):
The national projects are not something handed down from above—they are United Russia’s projects . . . They were developed with your input taken into account. Your proposals and the proposals of the government form their basis . . . The realization of the national projects is strictly the work of the party.
During the decade, a lot of attention has also been focused on moves made by the Putin administration to expand the control over the national media. It is clear that the first aspiration of most of the media in Russia is not to deliver unbiased or balanced news. Instead, the media serves the existing elites in power. For this reason, the media uses every opportunity to demonstrate current leaders in their best light, while marginalizing those trying to challenge that power.
State control over the media has increased rapidly after Putin took office. The most significant changes concern the television . Two of the three major federal television channels - Channel One and Russia TV- are state owned and in 2001, Gazprom-Media, a media branch of the giant state-owned gas company, Gazprom, took over NTV and most of the other assets of Gusinsky’s Media-Most company (Bessudnov 2008: 183). The Russian print media has largely followed the same path as television: although many of the newspapers are in the hands of private owners and are officially autonomous, free from the Kremlin’s control, they have repeatedly been accused of serving the interests of the ruling elite.
Conclusion
Since the establishment of the party, United Russia has overwhelmingly dominated the landscape of Russia’s party politics. Yet, many political and institutional modifications were done in order to accomplish that. The aim of this work was to identify these key strategies that supported United Russia in becoming a dominant party and strategies it adopted in order to maximize its power.
The study showed that during the 2000s, with the aim to create a solid ground for the establishment of a more stable and balanced party system many changes in the Russia's electoral system were introduced. Although Putin's reforms managed to create foundations for the stability of Russia’s political regime, it was done with the cost of limited party competition. As a result , the outcome of these arrangements was the emergence of a strong dominating party – United Russia. Through the adoption of a populist, catch-all program, the efforts to recruit supporters from all segments of society, the control over the media, the ability to freely use state resources and the effective use of patronage, United Russia has successfully secured its position in Russia’s political landscape.
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