20. asitõendid real evidence, physical evidence 21. kaudsed tõendid circumstantial evidence, indirect evidence 22. lubatavad tõendid admissible evidence 23. lubamatud tõendid inadmissible evidence 24. võistlev menetlus adversary / adversarial procedure 25. uuriv menetlus inquisitorial/inquisitional procedure 26. kahjustavaid tõendeid ümber lükkama rebut damaging evidence 27. kohtuvaidlused litigation 28. kohtukulud court costs, costs of an action 29. riigi/tasuta õigusabi legal aid 30. therefore seetõttu, sellepärast 31. as well samuti, ka 32. formerly varem 33. in favour of kasuks 34. at the discretion of kellegi otsustusel 1
preparing to hear a matter 2. preliminary hearing - court hearing which is held within 2 months after filing of the statement of claim 3. default judgement – court decision which is made without the defendant being present 4. testimony of a witness – statements made by the witness 5. relevance and admissibility of evidence – the given legal relationship with the submitted evidence in permissible by law 6. counterclaim – rebut the arguments of a claim 7. adjudication of a matter on merits – hold a court session immediately or at the latest within 3 months after filing of the statement of claim 8. court session in camera – limit the access for third parties to hear the court session 9. summations – closing statements in the proceeding 10. a minor – a person who is less than 18 years of age 11. bailiff – official who executes court judgements
How might you then solve the four puzzles, in regard to names? 3 Respond on Russell's behalf to one or more of the two opening objec- tions; or come up with a further objection. 4 Does Searle's Cluster Theory really avoid objections 1 and 2, in ways that Russell's stricter version of Descriptivism did not? 5 Can you think of an objection to Searle's theory that does not apply to Russell's original theory? 6 Can Russell rebut any of Kripke's objections 37? Even if Russell can- not, can Searle? 44 Reference and referring Further reading · Russell's Name Claim is defended most accessibly in "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" (1918/1956). · For some criticisms of the Name Claim similar to Kripke's, see Donnellan (1970). · Searle addresses the matter of fictional names in chapter 3 of Searle (1979a). He replies to some of Kripke's objections in chapter 9 of Searle (1983)
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