Õiguse filosoofia loengukonspekt
rights. The fact that we could well say this shows that the ordinary modern idiom of 'rights' does not
follow Hobbes all the way to his contrast between law and rights. Nor did Locke or Pufendorf; yet they
did adopt his stipulation that 'a right' (jus) is paradigmatically a liberty.14 Their successors are those who
today defend the 'choice' theory of rights, which as we saw in the preceding section is one eligible way
ofaccounting for most, but not all, of the modern grammar of rights. And even those who defend the
'benefit' theory of rights are far from using the idiom of Aquinas, since (in common with ordinary
language-speakers and lawyers in all modern languages) they think of 'a right' as something beneficial
which a person has (a 'moral [including legal] quality' in Grotius's terminology), rather than 'that which is
annaabi.ee 
