Seetõttu ei saa neile teha omistusi intentsionaalsest seisukohast, kuid ometi ütleb intuitsioon, et halvatud isikutel on uskumused ja soovid.Ei saa öelda, et neil oleksid need seisundid, mida saaks omistada, kui nad käituksid normaalselt. Dennett: halvatutel on vaimuelu, et see võib ajapikku kuhtuda, jättes järele vaid ajaloolise jälje selle kunagisest intentsionaalsusest. 9. Eliminatiivmaterialism(Churchland, Eliminatiivmaterialism ja propositsioonilised hoiakud) Varajane eliminativism. Teadusfilosoof Paul Feyerabend, varane Rorty: identsusteooria ründamine praegu kõneldava keele seisukohast (vaimsete mõistete omadustest lähtudes) ei ole mõttekas, sest keel areneb koos meie teooriatega. See rünnak sarnaneks vaidlusega, kus väitele, et üleloomulikud nähtused on tegelikult teatud loodusnähtused, vaieldakse vastu, kasutades argumendina seda, kuidas kõnelevad ebausklikud inimesed
So, if there are no analytic sentences, no two English sentences are precisely synonymous, not even "Bambi's mother was a doe" and "Bambi's mother was a female deer."5 It gets worse. Here is Quine's second challenge to the positivists, and indeed to practically everyone. It is not just that there are no analytic sen- tences, and not just that no two sentences are synonymous. It is that there is no such thing as meaning. Quine denies our "meaning facts" in the first place, and urges an eliminativism or nihilism about meaning, in the form of his doctrine of the "indeterminacy of translation." Here too Quine has given a number of arguments, some more convincing than others. One (from Quine 1969) can be stated very simply: Individual sen- tences do not have verification conditions. But, if a sentence had any meaning at all, it would be a verification condition. Therefore, individual sentences do not have meanings at all. Thus does Quine save verificationism from objec- tion 5
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