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keys, one after another, would eventually yield the plaintext. Success this way is an illusion. For while exhaustive trials would indeed bring out the true plaintext, they would also bring out every other possible text of the same length, and there would be no way to tell which was the right one. Suppose that the cryptanalyst deciphers a four-letter military message with every key, beginning with AAAA. He strikes plaintext at key AABI: kiss. Unlikely in this context. He presses on. Key AAEL yields plaintext kill. Better—but he wants to make sure. He continues through key AAEM, giving kilt, which might be an oblique reference to a Scottish maneuver, and AAER, kiln. Further down the line he reaches fast at GZBM and slow at KHIA, stop at HRIW and gogo at XSTT, hard at PZVQ and easy at RZBU. He finds when he ends at ZZZZ that he has merely compiled a list of every possible four-letter word—the hard way. He can no more pick the right solution from this list than he can from a
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