Keelefilosoofia raamat
either, and vows are not the sorts of things that can be lent. So any simile
theorist faces the daunting task of translating all of those things at once into
resemblance talk. One would have to make free use of the sort of contextual
placeholder that I used in explicating (3). A first pass might be: "When x,
which is like a person's blood, does something that resembles burning, how
prodigally y, which is like a person's soul, does something similar to lending
some things that are vowlike to z, which resembles a person's tongue." We
are not much the wiser. And refinement is needed, because for "the blood"
metaphorically to burn is probably something distinctive to a bloodlike sub-
stance, not for it to do something that resembles the literal burning of, say, a
piece of wood. It is no wonder that simile theorists have in the main stuck to
simple subjectpredicate examples like (1) and (2).
The Pragmatic Theory