Keelefilosoofia raamat
ibility" conditions. Most notably, Adams (1965) and others have defended
the view that indicative conditionals lack truth conditions and truth-value.
Moreover, some philosophers hold (following the Positivists) that certain
grammatically declarative sentences are not fact-stating even though they
might be taken by the naive to be so. According to the emotivists in moral
philosophy, moral judgments are only evincings or ventings, semantically just
like groans, grunts of protest, cheers, and the like. If so, then such "factually
defective" sentences do not have truth-values. So a T-sentence directed upon
one ("`Murder is wrong' is true iff murder is wrong") should come out false
or anomalous.4
Reply to the second rejoinder
It is easy enough for the truth-condition theorist who is also an emotivist
(or whatever) to restrict her/his truth theory against nonfactual sentences in
the first place
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