Keelefilosoofia raamat
his analytical purposes is the weaker contention that names are somehow
equivalent in meaning to descriptions (let us call that weaker thesis the
Description Theory of proper names).
Yet even the less ambitious Description Theory has since come in for
severe criticism.
Opening objections
Objection 1
Searle (1958) complained that, if proper names are equivalent to descrip-
tions, then for each name there must be some particular description that it is
equivalent to. For example, if I unreflectively muse,
(5) Wilfrid Sellars was an honest man,
what am I saying, given that I know a fair number of individuating facts about
Sellars? Searle tries out a couple of candidate description types, and finds
them wanting. We might suppose that "Wilfrid Sellars" is for me equivalent
to "The one and only thing x such that x is F and x is G and . . . ," where F, G,
and the rest are all the predicates that I would apply (or believe truly appli-
cable) to the man in question
annaabi.ee 
