Keelefilosoofia raamat
As if directly inspired by that passage, Searle
produced quite a number of such rules, and so far as they go they are plausible.
Davidson added the qualification, "no test for metaphor that does not call for
taste"; very likely Searle would concede that point, since he makes no claim to
completeness and does not predict that even a final set of principles will give
perfectly determinate results. But he wins this round on points.
Davidson's second appeal was to open-endedness, unparaphrasability, and
downright nonpropositionality. Searle's account predicts open-endedness,
since we may expect that his second and third stages will often fail to tamp
down the possible speaker-meanings to just one or two. As for unparaphras-
ability, Searle grants that often we use metaphor precisely because there is
no handy and accessible literal expression that means the same thing, but he
argues that, if something is a linguistic meaning at all, in principle it could be
annaabi.ee 
