Keelefilosoofia raamat
(2) Pegasus never existed.
(2) seems to be true and seems to be about Bellerophon's steed, Pegasus. But
if (2) is true, (2) cannot be about Pegasus, for there is no such entity for it to
be about. Likewise, if (2) is about Pegasus, then (2) is false, for Pegasus must
then in some sense exist.
It is worth noting a previous solution to the Problems of Apparent
Reference to Nonexistents and Negative Existentials, rejected by Frege and
later even more vehemently so by Russell. J1 is uncontroversial; J2 seems
obvious; J4 is just a fact; and J5 is trivially true. Alexius Meinong (1904/1960)
had boldly leapt to deny J6, insisting à la St. Anselm that any possible object
of thought--even a self-contradictory one--has being of a sort even though
only a few such things are so lucky as to exist in reality as well. Moriarty
has being of that sort and can be referred to, even though--fortunately for
England and the world--he lacks the property of existing. 2
annaabi.ee 
