Keelefilosoofia raamat
simply, truth condition.
First reply
Put in this way, the argument assumes that "understanding" must itself be
a "narrow" or "in the head" concept. That is, to say the least, not obvious.
(I leave to you the exercise of constructing a Twin-Earth counterexample.)
Realizing that the argument needs a narrow concept of understanding also
should make us reconsider the simple equating of "knowing meaning" with
understanding and vice versa, truistic as that equating may have sounded at
first.
Second reply
Further, the argument assumes that wide concepts cannot per se figure in the
etiology of behavior. As is made clear by the "intentional causation" litera-
ture of some years ago, 3 "figuring in" can be done in many ways. There is no
doubt that behavior depends counterfactually on wide states of people: Had
I wanted water (H 2O), I would have gone into the kitchen to get some. And