Keelefilosoofia raamat
1 We code S onto a punch card.
2 We feed the card into our machine.
3 The machine lights up "TRUE."
(And remember that the machine has never once been wrong.) Thus, there
exists a possible set of experiences that would confirm S, even if S is intui-
tively gibberish. And S's own particular verification condition would be that,
when it is coded and put to the machine, the machine lights up "TRUE."
Thus the Verification Theory is trivialized, since every string of words is
verifiable, and it assigns the wrong meanings to particular sentences (because
very few sentences mean anything about punch cards being fed into infernal
machines).
Something is wrong with that argument. But I have found it very hard to
say exactly what.
Objection 6
Any version of the Verification Principle must presuppose an "observation
language" in which experiences are described; hence it must countenance