Keelefilosoofia raamat
ing with its truth condition.
What about the meaning facts, then? I have already mentioned the ways in
which the Truth-Condition Theory accounts for synonymy and ambiguity.
It accounts for meaning inclusion and especially for entailment as well. "Fa
and not Fb" entails "Fa" because, according to our truth definition, "Fa and
not Fb" could not be true unless "Fa" were. A truth definition for a language
predicts the felt synonymies, entailments, and other semantic relations by
reference to the semantic compounding rules it codifies.
And, in part, the contemporary truth-condition theorist studies linguistic
constructions in just the same way that Russell worked on descriptions. S/he
marshals a whole bunch of meaning facts about a particular kind or group
of sentences in which s/he is interested--facts about synonymy relations,
ambiguities, entailment relations, and so on--and tries to explain those
annaabi.ee 
