Keelefilosoofia raamat
For Frege, the "sense" was, roughly, a particular "way of presenting" the
term's putative referent. Though itself an abstract entity rather than a men-
tal or psychological one, the sense reflects a person's conception or way of
thinking of the referent. Frege sometimes expressed senses in the form of
definite descriptions; for example, the sense of the name "Aristotle" might
be "Plato's disciple and the teacher of Alexander the Great," or "the Stagirite
teacher of Alexander" (Frege 1892/1952b: 58n). A sense determines a unique
referent, but multiple senses may determine the same referent.
Let us now see how Frege attacked the other three puzzles.
Negative Existentials
(2) Pegasus never existed.
As before, (2) seems to be true and seems to be about Pegasus, but if
(2) is true, (2) cannot be about Pegasus . . . . Notice that there is a worse
complication here than is raised by the Problem of Apparent Reference to
annaabi.ee 
