TheCodeBreakers
between them and their army headquarters—the two highest echelons of
field command.
Their messages lay naked to the enemy. The general inefficiency that
crippled the Russian mobilization had fouled up distribution of the new
military cipher and its keys. Within a single army (the 2nd), for instance,
the XIII Corps did not have the key needed to read cryptograms from its
immediate neighbor, the VI Corps. The war broke out August 4. Before a
fortnight had passed Russian signalmen were no longer even trying to
encipher messages, but were passing them over the radio in the clear.
In accordance with the Russian strategy, General Pavel Rennenkampf,
commanding the 1st, or northern, Army, began moving into East Prussia
on August 17. The German general staff had long foreseen the two-
pronged attack—the terrain made it obvious. They had left only one army
to defend East Prussia because their strategy called for a quick and
decisive victory against France first
annaabi.ee 
