Keelefilosoofia raamat
Another, sub-
sentential example would be adverbs, such as "slowly." "Jane swims" is true
in a world if and only if the referent of "Jane" in that world is among the
things that swim there, because the extension of "swims" is just the class
of that world's denizens that swim. But what about "Jane swims slowly"?
Grammatically, "slowly" modifies the predicate "swims," making it into the
complex predicate "swims slowly." And the intensional semanticist maintains
that the semantics follows in just the same way: The intension of "slowly" is a
function from intensions to intensions; it picks up the intension of "swims"
and turns it into a modified intension, namely the function that looks at a
world and picks out the class of things that swim slowly in that world.1
The possible-worlds theory has a deft way with belief sentences also. Let us
return for a moment to Frege. As a solution to the Problem of Substitutivity,
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