Keelefilosoofia raamat
variant. He suggested that a name is associated, not with any particular
description, but with a vague cluster of descriptions. As he puts it, the force of
"This is N," where N is replaced by a proper name, is to assert that a sufficient
but so far unspecified number of "standard identifying statements" associ-
ated with the name are true of the object demonstrated by "this"; that is, the
name refers to whatever object satisfies a sufficient but vague and unspecified
number (SBVAUN) of the descriptions generally associated with it. (Searle
adds the metaphysical claim that to be the person N is to have a SBVAUN of
the relevant properties.)
The vagueness is important; Searle says it is precisely what distinguishes
names from descriptions, and in fact is why we have and use names as
opposed to descriptions. Notice that, if the Name Claim were correct, then
proper names' only function would be to save breath or ink; they would be
just shorthand