Keelefilosoofia raamat
Some of your
behavior is causally the result of my saying certain words that mean what
they do, and some of my behavior results from your saying meaningful words
likewise. Legal decisions in capital cases sometimes turn on the meanings of
words, and so on. Thus meaning, whatever it is, must have some causal power
(some push and pull, some punch, some biff). But propositions, as entirely
abstract entities, precisely do not have causal powers. They sit quiescently and
uselessly outside spacetime, and do nothing. So it is hard to see how proposi-
tions could figure in the explanation of human linguistic behavior or could in
any other way help to account for the dynamic social role of meaning. And
therefore they seem to be unnecessary posits after all.
Reply
Even if propositions do not help in the explanation of human behavior,
human behavior is not the only thing that needs explaining. The "meaning
74 Theories of meaning