Keelefilosoofia raamat
transform the new, zany logical forms into familiar English; as Blackburn
points out (1984: 289), a Davidsonian treatment of a non-truth-functional
(and intensional) construction such as "because" or "believes that" requires
at least a "heavy commitment to concealed logical forms." (But, as before,
belief sentences in particular are already an ugly problem for any theory of
meaning.)
Objection 6
Truth-conditional semantics must fully disclose the general notion of truth it
is presupposing. But the only plausible general analysis of truth is in terms of
stating or asserting things: "One who makes a statement or assertion makes
a true statement if and only if things are as, in making that statement, he
states them to be" (Strawson 1970: 15). Which is to say that the analysis must
be made in terms of communication, which must be cashed à la Grice. Thus,
although the letter of truth-conditional semantics may be unobjectionable,
annaabi.ee 
