Keelefilosoofia raamat
meaning--speaker-meaning, for example. Now we can add that here is now
an illocutionary kind of meaning, force, which is not the same thing as locu-
tionary meaning either. Each of these kinds of meaning is perfectly real and
indispensable to language use. 3
Infelicities and constitutive rules
Speech acts are conventional acts; just as any "use" theorist would have it,
they are embedded in and defined by social customs, practices, and institu-
tions. Their performings are governed by rules of many kinds. The rules are
usually unwritten, merely implicit in normative social behavior.
Searle (1965, 1969) divides speech-act rules into constitutive rules and
regulative rules. (Merely) regulative rules "regulate antecedently or inde-
pendently existing forms of behavior," whereas constitutive rules "create or
define new forms of behavior" (1969, p. 33). Thus, for example, rules of eti-