"nonstatements" - 1 õppematerjal

Keelefilosoofia raamat

And that does not follow. The obvious reason we would not say "That's false" is that to do so would be misleading by way of the Maxim of Strength: You are in a position to say something much stronger and more informative and a better contribu- tion to the conversation, namely, "Hold on; there is no king of France." So, even if Strawson's own competing thesis (that statements with nonreferring singular terms in them should be taken as nonstatements rather than as false statements) is actually correct, his argument does not show that. The basic idea of conversational implicature is almost universally accepted, as are most of its standard uses in philosophy. But Grice's theory of it is now not so widely granted. There are two main direct complaints. First, some 162 Pragmatics and speech acts philosophers are suspicious of the amount of complex but nearly instanta-