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"nonreferring" - 1 õppematerjal

Keelefilosoofia raamat
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Keelefilosoofia raamat

entity that (of course) has being, that that entity lacks existence. Secretariat, Seabiscuit and Smarty Jones were horses that existed but lacked wings; Pegasus had wings but failed to exist. It happens. Less implausibly, Frege himself dealt with Apparent Reference to Nonexistents by rejecting J3: He posited abstract entities that he called "senses" and argued that a singular term is meaningful in virtue of having one of those over and above its referent--or in the case of a nonreferring singular term, instead of a referent. That is, since the singular term expresses a sense, it is meaningful whether or not it actually refers. Frege's solutions to Negative Existentials and the other two problems will be briefly surveyed in the next chapter. Frege's Puzzle about Identity An identity statement such as (3) Mark Twain is Samuel Langhorne Clemens contains two singular terms, both of which (if the statement is true) pick out or denote the same person or thing

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