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that Trieste fails to "be Vienna," but as we saw in the previous chapter such
flaccid uses of names are unusual.
Kripke argues that when one uses the name "Nixon" to refer to a person
in this world and then starts describing hypothetical scenarios or alternative
possible worlds, continuing to use the name, one is talking about the same
person. So if you ask, "Might Nixon have joined the Black Panthers rather
than becoming President?," the answer may be yes or may be no, but the sce-
nario you are considering is one in which Nixon, that very person, is a Black
Panther--not one in which whoever or whatever was the U.S. President was a
Panther. You are not imagining a world in which a Black Panther is President
of the US.
But what of Russell's spot-check argument? In response to "Whom do
you mean by `Lili Boulanger'/`Wilfrid Sellars'?" you promptly cough up a
description or cluster of descriptions. Likewise Searle's appeal to teaching
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