" I interrupted him, wheeling toward him. My face got drenched as I looked up at his expression. His eyes were wickedly amused. "Will you please allow me to finish?" I bit my lip and clasped my hands together, interlocking my fingers, so I couldn't do anything rash. "I heard you say you were going to Seattle that day, and I was wondering if you wanted a ride." That was unexpected. "What?" I wasn't sure what he was getting at. "Do you want a ride to Seattle?" "With who?" I asked, mystified. "Myself, obviously." He enunciated every syllable, as if he were talking to someone mentally handicapped. I was still stunned. "Why?" "Well, I was planning to go to Seattle in the next few weeks, and, to be honest, I'm not sure if your truck can make it." "My truck works just fine, thank you very much for your concern." I started to walk again, but I was too surprised to maintain the same level of anger. "But can your truck make it there on one tank of gas?" He matched my pace again.
It had not mattered that I do not like chocolate bars; the Boy Scout had made a concession to me, click, and whirr, I responded with a concession of my own. Of course, the tendency to reciprocate with a concession is not so strong that it will work in all instances on all people; none of the weapons of influence considered in this book is that strong. However, in my exchange with the Boy Scout, the tendency had been sufficiently powerful to leave me in mystified possession of a pair of unwanted and overpriced candy bars. Why should I feel obliged to reciprocate a concession? The answer rests once again in the benefit of such a tendency to the society. It is in the interest of any human group to have its members working together toward the achievement of common goals. However, in many social interactions the participants begin with requirements and demands that are unacceptable to one another. Thus, the society
Pokorny and Deubner groups into the offices of the operations staffs of the German and Austro-Hungarian commands. Helped by this, they parried the first tentative Russian advances, and then themselves swept through the whole enemy line in a rapid onslaught that penetrated 80 miles in two weeks. Time after time, their solutions enabled the Central Powers to take steps which were so perfectly the right thing to do in each tactical situation that the Russian general staff was mystified by its opponents' apparent clairvoyance. Once the Germans fell back just two days before an overwhelming assault was to be launched; had they remained in place, their position would quickly have become critical. After the Germans captured Lodz, the Russians pondered the precision of the enemy moves and decided that the Germans must have obtained intelligence from air reconnaissance. Eventually, however, the conviction grew that the foe must be reading their ciphers
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