Keelefilosoofia raamat
Also, if
such sentences were true just in virtue of someone's having written them in
popular books or stories, then it would be equally true that Holmes existed,
Hamlet existed, and so on, since people say those things in books and stories
too; this point is strangely overlooked.) Yet some people want to insist that
fictional sentences are literally truth-valueless rather than false; if you are
sympathetic to this, you will want to hold a Kripkean theory of fictional
names rather than Russell's (Kripke 1972/1980:1568). Donnellan (1974)
defends such a theory in more detail.
Kripke has a further and in a way more fundamental objection to the
Description Theory, but it requires a bit of technical apparatus. That appa-
ratus is one we will be needing again anyway. I shall develop it in the next
chapter.
Summary
· The four logical puzzles about reference arise just as insistently for
annaabi.ee 
