Keelefilosoofia raamat
only moves in the game. But then it seems even more obvious that the game
is not even the beginning of an actual language, and that the moves do not
have meaning in the same way that utterances of English sentences do. So the
"use" theorist's explicit conditions are not sufficient for something's being a
language.
Second reply
Waismann (1965a: 158) anticipates an objection of this kind. He hints at a
competing reply: that genuine language-games are "integrat[ed] . . . into life."
By contrast, the parlor-game words, like chess moves and tennis shots, "bear
a far less close relation to life than words used in earnest." A language-game
cannot be encapsulated, something that we keep at arm's length and play just
when we feel like it.
Rejoinder
But some language-games, such as the telling of shaggy-dog jokes, are
encapsulated and played only occasionally and at will. Also, even if we agree
annaabi.ee 
