Keelefilosoofia raamat
" Grice is in part
concerned to eradicate that argument form. And we are now in a position to
appreciate an example of it (a slightly convoluted example, because it is itself
about falsity). Recall, from chapter 2, Strawson's first objection to Russell's
Theory of Descriptions. He says that no one would ever respond to an utter-
ance of "The present King of France is bald" by saying, "That's false." And
he is right about that. But from it he infers that the sentence uttered was
not false; that is, that "That's false" would itself be false. And that does not
follow. The obvious reason we would not say "That's false" is that to do so
would be misleading by way of the Maxim of Strength: You are in a position
to say something much stronger and more informative and a better contribu-
tion to the conversation, namely, "Hold on; there is no king of France." So,
even if Strawson's own competing thesis (that statements with nonreferring
annaabi.ee 
