Keelefilosoofia raamat
of things in support of which one gives reasons, rebuts challenges, and so
on. (One can of course offer practical reasons for having made a particular
chess move or tennis shot, but Brandom means evidential reasons, utterances
that give us reason to believe some statement of fact. Again, his paradigm is
that of an inferential reason, and chess moves and the like are certainly not
inferences.) Nor is objection 6 a problem, for Sellars himself gave an elegant
inferentialist account of that clauses. Though Brandom holds that subsen-
tential expressions "have meanings" only derivatively from whole sentence
meanings, he also recognizes a weak kind of compositionality, and so he may
evade objection 3. And, admirably, he addresses some fairly detailed seman-
tic phenomena: proper names, descriptions, indexicals, quantification, and
anaphora, in terms of their characteristic contributions to the commitment/
entitlement potentials of sentences in which they occur.4
annaabi.ee 
