Keelefilosoofia raamat
For example, we constantly say things
that are not strictly true and are known by both speaker and hearer to be not
true, but without being perceived as flouting the Maxim of Truthfulness. We
speak loosely; for example, using the noun "record" to include musical tapes
and compact discs; and exaggeration is ubiquitous.8 But utterances of those
kinds do not normally initiate Gricean reasoning, as in "Hmmm, she has
flouted the Maxim of Truthfulness. Is it sarcasm? Or maybe she's indicat-
ing that she's not allowed to talk about this . . . ." We do not even tacitly
notice such violations. Wilson and Sperber suggest that hearers' expectations
of truthfulness are only a rough-and-ready byproduct of their more basic
expectations of relevance (p. 619).
Further: According to Grice's picture, a hearer recovers the utterance's
full literal locutionary or propositional content ("He has said that p,"), and
then proceeds to reason from that combined with the Cooperative Principle
annaabi.ee 
