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that of an inferential reason, and chess moves and the like are certainly not
inferences.) Nor is objection 6 a problem, for Sellars himself gave an elegant
inferentialist account of that clauses. Though Brandom holds that subsen-
tential expressions "have meanings" only derivatively from whole sentence
meanings, he also recognizes a weak kind of compositionality, and so he may
evade objection 3. And, admirably, he addresses some fairly detailed seman-
tic phenomena: proper names, descriptions, indexicals, quantification, and
anaphora, in terms of their characteristic contributions to the commitment/
entitlement potentials of sentences in which they occur.4
In any case, the centrality of epistemological notions to inferentialist
theories--defense, support, justification, acceptance--suggests that the
theories are closer in spirit to verification accounts than to Wittgenstein's
original idea. See chapter 8.
A somewhat different sort of "use" theory (Alston 1963, 2000; Barker
annaabi.ee 
