Keelefilosoofia raamat
44 Reference and referring
Further reading
· Russell's Name Claim is defended most accessibly in "The Philosophy
of Logical Atomism" (1918/1956).
· For some criticisms of the Name Claim similar to Kripke's, see
Donnellan (1970).
· Searle addresses the matter of fictional names in chapter 3 of Searle
(1979a). He replies to some of Kripke's objections in chapter 9 of
Searle (1983). More generally, there is a huge literature on fictional
names; see, for example, Everett and Hofweber (2000), Braun (2005),
and the references therein.
· Burge (1973), Loar (1976), Bach (1987) and others have defended more
specific sorts of Description theory against Kripke, versions that avoid
some of the objections.
4 Proper names: Direct Reference
and the CausalHistorical Theory
Overview
In a further argument against description theories of proper names, Kripke
appealed to the notion of a "possible world" or universe alternative to our
own