"empiri" - 1 õppematerjal

Keelefilosoofia raamat

Suppose the principle is taken to be empirically verifiable. That is, assume it is supposed to be confirmed by our experiences of sentences, their mean- ings, and their verification conditions, and meaning has been found to track 104 Theories of meaning verification condition. But (as in objection 1) that presupposes that we can recognize sentence meanings independently of assigning them verification conditions. And it is not clear just what we should count as the "empiri- cal" data on which the principle is based. Survey results from street corners? Dictionary definitions? (Never that.) One's own linguistic "intuitions"? (Also, the Verification Principle's own meaning would then, by the principle itself, coincide with its own verification condition, the set of experiences as of meanings coinciding with verification conditions; that is a nasty tangle, though I am unsure whether it is ultimately vicious.)