Keelefilosoofia raamat
Speech acts and illocutionary force 145
(4) I apologize.
(5) I double. [A bid in bridge.]
(6) Raise you five. [A bet in poker.]
(7) Nay. [A vote on a formal motion.]
Except possibly for the last two, these are declarative sentences, so (in
particular) the verificationist must address them; what are their respective
verification conditions? Perhaps that question is too hard, or unfair in view
of Quine's Duhemian objection. But what are their truth conditions?
We could direct T-sentences upon them. For example,
"I promise to pay you for the diapers" is true if and only if I promise to
pay you for the diapers.
Really? (No, not really.)
"I double" is true if and only if I double.
Possibly; perhaps "I double," as said by me on the appropriate occasion, is
true if and only if I do double on that occasion. But it seems that we are leav-