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therefore synonymous. This Proposition Theory fits the various "meaning
facts" well, since "proposition" is essentially another word for "meaning."
But critics have questioned whether it explains the meaning facts satisfacto-
rily, or indeed at all.
When this book began, the topics of reference and meaning were not sepa-
rate, because the most common naive idea people have about meaning is that
meaning is reference. In chapter 1 we disparaged the commonsensical but
untenable Referential Theory of Meaning. So we must now confront mean-
ing directly, and look at some more sophisticated theories of meaning.
Like any theory, a theory of meaning has to have a proprietary set of data.
What are the primary data for a theory of meaning? I will refer to them cor-
porately as "the meaning facts."
First, as we emphasized in chapter 1, there is meaningfulness itself. Some
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