MOVE IF THE SOLDIERS REALLY ARE BRAVE THEN THIS SURELY ISNT THE OUTCOME ANY OF THEM WANTED EACH WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THAT ALL STAND AND FIGHT WHAT WE HAVE HERE THEN IS A CASE IN WHICH THE INTERACTION OF MANY INDIVIDUALLY RATIONAL DECISIONMAKING PROCESSES ONE PROCESS PER SOLDIER PRODUCES AN OUTCOME INTENDED BY NOONE MOST ARMIES TRY TO AVOID THIS PROBLEM JUST AS CORTEZ DID SINCE THEY CANT USUALLY MAKE RETREAT PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE THEY MAKE IT ECONOMICALLY IMPOSSIBLE THEY SHOOT DESERTERS THEN STANDING AND FIGHTING IS EACH SOLDIERS INDIVIDUALLY RATIONAL COURSE OF ACTION AFTER ALL BECAUSE THE COST OF RUNNING IS SURE TO BE AT LEAST AS HIGH AS THE COST OF STAYING
German pre-assault bombardment, and the location of the addressee of the message told them where that attack would come. Jubilantly they communicated their information to the operations officers: Ludendorff was going to hammer out the dent, and the German sledge would crash down onto the French line between Montdidier and Compiegne, a sector about 50 miles north of Paris. Aerial reconnaissance confirmed the daylight transport of munitions. Deserters reported that the onslaught would take place June 7. Foch, in supreme command, shifted his reserves into position, thinned out the front lines, upon which the brunt of the cannonade would fall, and braced his secondary defenses. On the 6th, officers were told that "the offensive is imminent." Tension mounted. The 7th passed without enemy action, and the 8th: Ludendorff had postponed the attack for two days to bring up more guns and munitions because, he said, "thorough
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