Keelefilosoofia raamat
downright nonpropositionality. Searle's account predicts open-endedness,
since we may expect that his second and third stages will often fail to tamp
down the possible speaker-meanings to just one or two. As for unparaphras-
ability, Searle grants that often we use metaphor precisely because there is
no handy and accessible literal expression that means the same thing, but he
argues that, if something is a linguistic meaning at all, in principle it could be
formulated (however cumbersomely) in some language or other.
I think Searle wins that round also, but there is a deeper issue about
nonpropositionality. Searle's account is propositional to the core, since all
speaker-meaning is meaning that so-and-so. If Davidson is right that what
we notice or see in metaphor "is not, in general, propositional in character,"
then by Searle's own principle aforementioned it is not a linguistic meaning
of any kind, not even a speaker-meaning.
annaabi.ee 
