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computes a complex intension given some primitive, simple intensions and
subjectpredicate grammar.)
If a proposition is in this way construed as a set of possible worlds, then
we do, after all, obtain nontrivial explanations of the meaning facts. Two
sentences will be synonymous if and only if they are true in just the same
worlds. A sentence will be ambiguous if there is a world in which it is both
true and false but without contradiction. And the possible-worlds construal
affords an elegant algebra of meaning by way of set theory: For example,
entailment between sentences is just the subset relation. S1 entails S2 if and
only if S2 is true in any world in which S1 is; that is, the set of worlds that is
S2's meaning is a subset of S1's meaning.
Thus, the implementation of truth conditions in terms of possible worlds
saves this sophisticated version of the Proposition Theory from Harman's