Keelefilosoofia raamat
) As
always with unexplicated versions of the Proposition Theory, that sounds
right but does not really explain anything so long as "sense" is merely taken
for granted. But the possible-worlds theorist can give the explanation more
content: Although the two terms corefer in the actual world, they diverge in
other worlds, so their intensions differ. Therefore the composite intensions
of otherwise similar sentences in which they appear will differ also. If believ-
ing is a relation between the believer and a proposition--that is, a sentence
intension--then of course the believer may believe the one intension without
believing the other.
At this point an adjustment is needed. As I noted above, the present version
of the possible-worlds theory counts two sentences as being synonymous
when and only when the two are true in just the same worlds. But what of
necessary truths that hold in every world? It would follow that every such
annaabi.ee 
